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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-FIRST AMENDMENT-PRIOR RE-
STRAINT-CLASS ACTIONS-SILENCE IS GOLDEN, BUT A RULE 23(d)
JUDICIAL ORDER IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON
SPEECH-Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
Throughout the history of the United States, perhaps nothing
has evoked the outrage of the masses like a restraint on free
speech. The first amendment to the United States Constitution
boldly states that no law shall be passed that will place a restraint
on free speech.' In the context of the class action, free speech takes
on a new and troublesome meaning.2
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may make
"appropriate" orders which deal with the course of proceedings,
the methods and manners of notice, the imposition of conditions
on parties being represented in the suit, the actual pleadings, and
other procedural matters.3 The limit to which such orders might
extend was carefully examined by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. (Bernard II).'
The court held that a judicial order restricting speech violated the
first amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-the class action rule.5 In or-
der to understand how the Fifth Circuit arrived at such a momen-
tous decision, the facts and holdings of the case must be examined
in great detail.
In April 1976, Gulf Oil Company (Gulf) and the Equal Employ-
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The cases invoking the doctrine of free speech are far too nu-
merous to exhaustively list, but a small sample will serve as a reminder of the nation's high
regard for free speech. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) ("We must
not confuse what is 'good,' 'desirable' or 'expedient' with what is constitutionally com-
manded by the First Amendment."); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)
(government has no power to restrict expressive activity because of its message); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("One's right . . . to free
speech,. . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections."); American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941)
(constitutional right to free speech and discussion is to be jealously guarded).
2. This note will not attempt to describe the history and nature of the class action. For a
comprehensive study of class actions, see Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89
HA'v. L. Rxv. 1318 (1976). The chapter on the attorney-client relationship in a class action
is especially informative for purposes of this note. Id. at 1592-604.
3. FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
4. 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
5. Id. at 463.
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) entered into a conciliation
agreement which covered Gulf's alleged discriminatory practices
against black employees at its Port Arthur, Texas, plant. Gulf
agreed to end all discriminatory practices, implement an affirma-
tive action program, and offer back pay based on length of service
to employees alleged to be discriminatees. Gulf agreed to notify
affected employees who were not parties to the agreement of their
entitlement to back pay. An employee's failure to respond to this
notice was to be regarded as an acceptance of the offer. According
to Gulf, back pay was offered to 614 present and former black em-
ployees of the plant, and to 29 female employees.
While implementation of the conciliation agreement was still in
progress, six present or retired black employees of the Port Arthur
plant filed a class suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19647 and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 18668 "on behalf
6. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. (Bernard 1), 596 F.2d 1249, 1263 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1979). Circuit
Judge Godbold dissented from the majority opinion in Bernard I. Id. at 1262. Since Judge
Godbold also wrote the majority opinion in Bernard H, the statement of facts which were
accurately stated in the dissenting opinion to Bernard I were adopted by the court. 619 F.2d
at 463.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Section 2000e-2 deals with unlawful employment prac-
tices, and provides, in part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), recognized that an
employer is not under an obligation to hire a person merely because he was formerly dis-
criminated against, or because he belongs to a minority group. What Congress requires, said
the Court, is the eradication of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." Id. at 431. In Griggs a North Carolina power company had
instituted a policy of requiring both a high school education and a satisfactory score on two
professionally prepared attitude tests for assignment to any department except labor. The
Court found that the company did not follow a policy of overt racial discrimination (al-
though they had followed such a policy prior to 1965) since blacks. were afforded the same
opportunities for advancement as were whites. Id. at 427-28. The primary focus in a case of
former discrimination is whether the employer is treating " 'some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides for "equal rights under the law":
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of black employees, black former employees of the plant, and black
applicants rejected for employment with Gulf Oil Company (not
limited to the Port Arthur plant)." In Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co.
(Bernard I),10 the court held that plaintiffs had a bona fide cause
of action under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1866, charging
Gulf with discrimination "against blacks in hiring, job assignments,
pay scales, discipline and discharge, discriminatory testing and
promotion practices, in denying training, and in refusing seniority
to blacks."" The plaintiffs further alleged that the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers' Union had agreed to and complied with
Gulf's discriminatory practices.12
The class action was brought before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the judge disposed
of four issues. First, he dismissed the plaintiffs' Title VII claim be-
cause they failed to file suit within ninety days after receiving an
official letter stating that conciliation efforts had failed and in-
forming plaintiffs that they were entitled to request a "Notice-of-
Right-to-Sue" letter from the EEOC.13 Second, he granted sum-
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have th* same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
The difference between a cause of action brought under Title VII and one brought under §
1981 is that the former is made inapplicable to certain employers (those having fewer than
fifteen employees and bona fide private membership clubs), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976),
while the latter has no such restrictions. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 460 (1975).
9. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1263 (5th Cir. 1979).
10. 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. 619 F.2d at 463. Discriminatory training programs and seniority systems are specifi-
cally proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d), (h).
12. 619 F.2d at 463.
13. 596 F.2d at 1254. The EEOC had "actively pursued conciliation efforts" with the
defendants until February, 1975, at which time it sent the plaintiffs a notice stating that the
defendants no longer wished to conduct conciliation efforts and advising plaintiffs that they
could request a "Notice-of-Right-to-Sue" letter at any time. Id. at 1253. The notice of right
to sue within 90 days is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). The Right-to-Sue
letters stated:
Notice of Right to Sue
Within 90 Days
Pursuant to Section 706(f) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, you are hereby notified that you may, within ninety (90) days of receipt
of this communication, institute a civil action in the appropriate Federal District
Court. If you are unable to retain a lawyer, the Federal District Court, in its dis-
cretion, may appoint a lawyer to represent you and to authorize commencement of
1980]
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mary judgment in favor of defendants on the plaintiffs' section
1981 claim, finding that the statute of limitations had run, totally
barring plaintiffs' claim.14 Third, the district court "'acknowl-
edge[d] a most compelling argument for the equitable doctrine of
laches in this particular case.' ,5 Finally, and providing the fuel to
rekindle a rapidly diminishing fire, the court handed down an or-
der prohibiting all communication between the parties to the ac-
tion, as well as their attorneys, and the members of the putative
class, without exception.1 6 This order, however, was later modified
by the chief judge of the district court to include two major excep-
tions. First, the modified order did not forbid communication be-
tween attorney and client when the client, on his own initiative,
sought to employ the attorney. Second, communications occurring
in the "regular course of business" or in the performance of the
duties of an agency or public office (such as the Attorney General)
which did not have the effect of solicitation were permitted. 17 This
modified order ignited the conflagration that was to follow."
the suit without payment of fees, costs, or security. If you decide to institute suit
and find you need assistance, you may take this notice, along with any Commis-
sion, to the Clerk of the Federal District Court nearest to the place where the
alleged discrimination occurred, and request that a Federal District Judge appoint
counsel to represent you.
596 F.2d at 1253 n.3.
14. Id. at 1256.
15. Id. (quoting the unpublished district court opinion).
16. Id. at 1258.
17. Id. at n.9.
18. The modified order was exactly patterned after those suggested by the Federal Judi-
cial Center in the MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LTGATION, PT. 2, § 1.41 (1977). The "Sample Or-
der Prohibiting Unauthorized Communications with Potential Litigants" was based on an
order of Judge Alfred Goodwin of the District of Oregon in Vanlandingham v. Denny's Res-
taurants, No. 69-424 (D. Ore. Oct. 29, 1970). Id. The order provided:
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) That Gulf's motion to modify Judge Steger's order dated May 28, 1976 is
granted;
(2) That Judge Steger's Order dated May 28, 1976 be modified so as to read as
follows:
In this action, all parties hereto and their counsel are forbidden directly or indi-
rectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any po-
tential or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the con-
sent and approval of the proposed communication and proposed addressees by
order of this Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to this
Court in writing with a designation of or description of all addressees and with a
motion and proposed order for prior approval by this Court of the proposed com-
munication. The communications forbidden by this order include, but are not lim-
ited to, (a) solicitation directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential
and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (b) solici-
tation of fees and expenses and agreements to pay fees and expenses from poten-
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On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, each of the four issues was ad-
tial and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (c)
solicitation by formal parties to the class action of requests by class members to
opt out in class actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P.; and (d)
communications from counsel or a party which may tend to misrepresent the sta-
tus, purposes and effects of the class action, and of any actual or potential Court
orders therein which may create impressions tending, without cause, to reflect ad-
versely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice. The
obligations and prohibitions of this order are not exclusive. All other ethical, legal
and equitable obligations are unaffected by this order.
This order does not forbid (1) communications between an attorney and his
client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) com-
munications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of
the duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not
have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel, or misrepresenting the sta-
tus, purposes or effect of the action and orders therein.
If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to communicate
with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so communicate
pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such communica-
tion file with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate
and substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.
(3) That Gulf be allowed to proceed with the payment of back pay awards and
the obtaining of receipts and releases from those employees covered by the Concil-
iation Agreement dated April 14, 1976, between Gulf, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Office for Equal Opportunity, U.S. Department
of the Interior. That the private settlement of charges that the employer has vio-
lated Title VII is to be encouraged, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus-
tries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1684,
48 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1976).
(4) That the Clerk of the Court mail a notice to all employees of Gulf at its
Port Arthur Refinery who are covered by the Conciliation Agreement and who
have not signed receipts and releases for back pay awards informing them that
they have 45 days from the date of the Clerk's notice to accept the offer as pro-
vided for by the Conciliation Agreement or such offer will expire until further
order of the Court;
(5) That the contents of the notice be the same as that set out in Appendix I;
(6) That Gulf bear the expense of mailing the notice and a copy of the Court's
order to the individuals covered by item (4) above;
(7) That all employees who have delivered receipts and releases to Gulf on or
before 55 days from the date of the Clerk's notice shall be deemed to have ac-
cepted the offer as contained in the Conciliation Agreement;
(8) That any further communication, either direct or indirect, oral or in writ-
ing (other than those permitted pursuant to paragraph (2) above) from the named
parties, their representatives or counsel to the potential or actual class members
not formal parties to this action is forbidden;
(9) That Gulf inform the Court 65 days from the date of the Clerk's notice to
be sent by the Clerk of the Court of the names of potential or actual class mem-
bers who have accepted the offer of back pay and signed receipts and releases
pursuant to the Conciliation Agreement and the names of those who have refused
or failed to respond.
596 F.2d at 1258-59 n.9.
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dressed, in turn, by the court. Subsequent to the district court's
holding, the Fifth Circuit noted, in Zambuto v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.,19 that the ninety-day period in which one
must file suit under Title VII does not commence until a letter
requesting the notice of right-to-sue is received by the EEOC and
the notice itself is dispatched. Therefore, the district court had
erred in dismissing the individual Title VII claims of Bernard and
Brown (two of the six employees or former employees representing
the class), who had filed a claim with the EEOC. 0 Moreover, since
the class claims and the claims of the other named plaintiffs who
had failed to file claims with the EEOC were properly before the
court, the court erred in dismissing these claims.2
The court of appeals also reversed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' section 1981 claim,
noting that in none of defendants' affidavits did they deny that
they had discriminated against blacks.2 s Therefore, a factual issue
did exist and summary judgment was improper. In addition, the
Fifth Circuit panel recognized that plaintiffs' claim was not totally
barred by the statute of limitations, as the district court had
held.2' The limitations question turned on whether the statute be-
gins to run when the elements necessary for the cause of action
first arise, or from the last date on which a defendant violated a
plaintiff's rights. The former argument, said the court, would be
"frivolous" because the statute of limitations would have expired
two years after the defendants first began discriminating against
the plaintiffs, regardless of whether the discrimination continued
19. 544 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord, Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 556
F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1977); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
20. 596 F.2d at 1254.
21. See Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 563 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir.
1977)(recognizing that relief cannot be granted on a class action basis without first approv-
ing the party's status as a class); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1968).
22. 596 F.2d at 1254-55.
23. 596 F.2d at 1255. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 56 the party moving for a summary judg-
ment has the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Since the defendant did not
provide any factual support for its claim, through affidavits, documents, or other evidence,
the plaintiffs had no duty to respond to the motion or to present opposing evidence. See,
e.g., Boazman v. Economics Lab., Inc. 537 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1976).
24. 596 F.2d at 1255. The court agreed with defendants that the applicable statute of
limitations was that provided by Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958) (two years). 596
F.2d at 1255 (citing Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir.
1974)).
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until the time that the plaintiffs filed suit2 5 The court adopted the
latter position, limiting the plaintiffs' recovery "to those violations
occurring within the two year period immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint or thereafter.""6
In holding the doctrine of laches inapplicable, the court recog-
nized that laches could apply to Title VII and section 1981 actions
brought by private plaintiffs, even in instances where the statutes
of limitation have not run.27 For the doctrine of laches to apply,
however, the court must find both "that the plaintiff delayed inex-
cusably in bringing the suit and that this delay unduly prejudiced
defendants." 8 The court found that for the purposes of summary
judgment, the plaintiffs' failure to file their claim until after the
EEOC process was complete was not inexcusable delay.2' More-
over, any prejudice suffered by defendants was caused by their
own negligence and disregard of EEOC regulations." Therefore,
the court found the doctrine of laches inapplicable."1
What created a furor in this case and caused the Fifth Circuit to
meet en banc, however, was not the holding that the Title VII
claims should have been heard on their merits by the district
court. Likewise, there was no controversy over whether the three-
judge panel had erred in reversing the district court's summary
judgment on the section 1981 claim. Nor did the judges of the
Fifth Circuit question the soundness of the panel in holding the
doctrine of laches inapplicable." Rather the appellants' petition
25. 596 F.2d at 1255-56.
26. Id. at 1256. The court cited, as authority, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d
398, 406 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In Franks, the Fifth
Circuit held that Title VII and § 1981 claims are equitable in nature. The doctrine of laches
is also considered an equitable remedy. In an equitable action, an equitable defense may be
raised, including the doctrine of laches. Id. See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969)(a claim for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for
damages, but is an equitable remedy).
27. 596 F.2d at 1256. See, e.g., Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 549 F.2d 1021, 1028 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977) ("The mere lapse of
time does not constitute laches.").
28. 596 F.2d at 1256.
29. Id. at 1257.
30. "EEOC regulations required defendants to maintain all records relevant to the Title
VII claims . 5..." 96 F.2d at 1258 n.8. Moreover, defendants admitted that plaintiffs' §
1981 claims were nearly identical to their Title VII claims. Therefore, the court held that
defendants could not have been prejudiced with respect to either Title VII or § 1981. Id.
Evidently, defendants' records lacked sufficient documentation to support a claim of unrea-
sonable delay or prejudice.
31. Id. at 1257.
32. 619 F.2d at 463. On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, adopted without comment
the holdings of the three-judge panel on the Title VII, § 1981 and laches claims. Id.
1980]
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for rehearing en banc was granted for the purpose of scrutinizing
the district court's pretrial nonsolicitation order forbidding com-
munication between "all parties hereto and their counsel" and
"any actual or potential class member not a formal party" without
the court's consent 83
Such an order in the class action context is contrary to the rule
in ordinary litigation that communications between attorney and
client are liberally permitted, and even encouraged, as part of the
attorney-client privilege.' According to the Manual for Complex
Litigation,5 prior restraint of communications among parties in a
class action is justified upon four grounds. First, allowing commu-
nications may encourage attorney solicitation of potential and ac-
tual class members. Second, attorney solicitation of fees may re-
sult. Third, attorneys for defendants may encourage potential and
actual class members to "opt out" of the class action. Finally, at-
torneys may "misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the
action and of court orders therein and which may confuse actual
and potential class members and create impressions which may re-
flect adversely on the court or the administration of justice." 6
There are several reasons why a party to a class action might
desire to communicate with other parties to the action. For exam-
ple, in a class action, one United States District Court permitted
class counsel to communicate with putative class members where
the communications were necessary to determine the parties' posi-
tions on the action and where a potential class member had indi-
cated his desire to engage in such communications. 7 Another dis-
trict court has stated that its local rule only forbids solicitations by
formal parties requesting a class member to opt out of a class ac-
tion." However, that district court ordered that all communica-
33. 619 F.2d at 465. For the complete text of the order see note 18 supra.
34. See 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). "The purpose of
the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
35. MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LMGATnON, PT. 1, § 1.41 (1978).
36. Id.
37. Bottino v. McDonald's Corp., 1973-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 74,810 (S.D. Fla.
1973). The court modified a local rule to the contrary-Local Rule 19B-in order to achieve
this result. Presumably, Local Rule 19B of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida was similar to the rule providing for the nonsolicitation order in
Bernard-Local Rule 6 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.
38. American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, 18 FvD. RULES SERV. 2d 292, 295 (D. Md. 1974).
The court recognized that Local Rule 20 of the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland is not aimed toward preventing the negotiation of settlements between a defen-
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tions "from the named parties, their representatives or counsel to
the potential class members is forbidden without the prior ap-
proval of this court.'"
Permitting communications between the class and the class op-
ponent may arguably preserve an ongoing business relationship be-
tween the two. So long as the parties do not discuss the litigation,
they may discuss other routine matters as may arise in the "regular
course of business or in the performance of the duties of a public
office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not have
the effect of. . .misrepresenting the status, purposes or effects of
the action and orders therein."' 0 Restraining direct communication
with the class is also desirable to the class opponent, in the case of
an ongoing business relationship, in order to prevent harm to the
goodwill of the opponent's business by communications from the
class attorney to the class."1 Finally, a rule allowing direct class-
opponent communication with the class may violate one of the ca-
nons of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which provides that counsel may communicate with
an opposing party only through that party's attorney. 2
dant and other putative class members who realize that a "spurious" class action has been
brought. Id. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455
F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972) ("it is only the settlement of the class action itself without court
approval that F.R. Civ. P. 23(e) prohibits" (citation omitted)).
39. American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, 18 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 292, 296 (D. Md. 1974).
40. Local 734, Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 57 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Civil Rule 22 of the United States District Court
Rules for the Northern District of Illinois, like the rule at issue in Bernard provides, in part:
In every potential and actual class action under Rule 23 F.R. Civ. P., all parties
thereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or indirectly, orally or in
writing, to communicate concerning such action with any potential or actual class
member not a formal party to the action without the consent of and approval of
the communication by order of the Court." (emphasis in the original)
41. Such a situation was not permitted by the Third Circuit to occur in Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). In Katz, the court
recognized the possible "catastrophic" effect of its card holders (who were also its account
debtors) withholding payments when they received notice of the pending class action. Carte
Blanche Corporation pointed out that many of its account debtors were delinquent in their
payments "entirely apart from delinquency induced by a class action notice." Id. at 757.
The Third Circuit could not disregard such "substantial elements of unfairness" to Carte
Blanche Corporation. Id. at 758.
42. A.B.A., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 7 (1976). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 H~Av. L. REV. 1318, 1599 (1976). DR 7-104 provides,
in part:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
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It is evident that when the proper circumstances exist, commu-
nication between counsel and all parties (actual or potential) to the
class suit may be permitted without prior court approval. However,
these situations have been strictly limited by the courts. It was not
until the constitutional issues were addressed that these situations
took on a new and broader significance.
In Bernard II, the Fifth Circuit en banc held that the district
court's order restricting communication by parties and their coun-
sel with actual or potential members of the class was an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint on speech. Also, the order was unconstitu-
tional even if tested under the less stringent standards applicable
to subsequent restraints on speech. Finally, the court found that
the order was not an "appropriate order" within the scope of the
class action rule.43
In Bernard I, the panel had approved the district court's modi-
fied order, holding that the order was "a permissible exercise of the
trial court's discretionary power in controlling a class action. '"4
The court cited an important decision handed down by the Fifth
Circuit, In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades,45 for sup-
port of its proposition that the trial court has vast discretion in
managing the class suit.4" The Bernard I panel rejected the plain-
tiffs' contention that the order would reduce their ability to man-
age effective discovery. 7 The trial judge is expected to exercise
"minimal judicial control of these communications" which means
that counsel may have his request for permission to communicate
with actual or potential class members who are not formal parties
to the action handled by telephone if he is at a distance from the
court.4" The Bernard I panel found that the plaintiffs had not
shown that the trial judge's assertion of "minimal control" consis-
tent with Rule 23 would prejudice them in any way.49 The panel
held that the order was not a prior restraint on speech, supporting
43. 619 F.2d at 478.
44. 596 F.2d at 1259.
45. 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977).
46. A trial court has managerial power to control the disposition of its cases with econ-
omy of effort for all those involved. Managerial power is a critical requirement for judges,
especially in the area of class actions. Id. at 1012. See also Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1973). In Huff, the court held that the trial judge, in his role as manager, may
permit discovery related to issues involved in maintenance of the class suit, and may order
an evidentiary hearing at which he may even make evidentiary inquiry, rather than being
bound by the face of the pleadings. Id. at 713.
47. 596 F.2d at 1260.
48. MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LGATION, supra note 35, § 1.41 at 50-51.
49. 596 F.2d at 1260.
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its decision with one district court case, Waldo v. Lakeshore Es-
tates, Inc.,50 and with language from the recent revision of the
Manual for Complex Litigation.1 Contrary to Bernard I, the crux
of the holding in Bernard II is that such an order clearly repre-
sents a serious restriction on first amendment rights.52
Prior restraints on freedom of speech and the press have long
been disfavored in the law.58 While a prior restraint is not per se
unconstitutional, it bears a heavy presumption against constitu-
tionality." Although the prior restraint in Bernard II was not
deemed justified by the court, there are occasions when a prior re-
straint will be permitted. In general, a system of prior restraint
"avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under proce-
dural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system."5 " A prior restraint may be justified only if the expression
50. 433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977). In Waldo, purchasers of real estate brought a class
action alleging factual misrepresentations and other irregularities in connection with the
purchases. The district court held that the rule forbidding communication fulfilled a legiti-
mate governmental interest and was not violative of first amendment rights. Id. at 789-91.
Waldo may be distinguished from Bernard II since it did not address the prior restraint
issue in the context of nonprofit client solicitation in a civil rights class action.
51. MANUAL POR COMPLEX LTGATION, PT. 1, § 1.41 (1978 Cum. Supp.). The Bernard I
panel refused to discuss the constitutionality of the order as a prior restraint on free speech,
after finding that the defendants' constitutional rights were adequately safeguarded by the
order, pursuant to subparagraph of paragraph two of the order which partially excepts the
assertion of a constitutional right to communicate with another party. 596 F.2d at 1261. The
party asserting a constitutional right must file within five days after the communication
either a copy of the communication or a summary of any oral communication. See note 18
supra. At best, this is a weak attempt to assure the parties some semblance of their consti-
tutional rights.
52. 619 F.2d at 466.
53. Id. at 467 (citing Near v. Minnestoa, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)). In Near, the Court recog-
nized that for approximately 150 years, there had been nearly a complete absence of at-
tempts to impose prior restraint on publication. 283 U.S. at 718. Moreover, liberty of speech
and the press is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 707.
54. 619 F.2d at 467. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59
(1975), the Court held that the presumption against prior restraints is greater-and the
scope of protection broader-than that against limits on free expression which bear criminal
sanctions. The rationale is that a democratic society prefers to chastise the few who abuse
their rights after they disobey the law rather than to tether them and all others in advance.
Id. at 559.
55. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). In a obscene film censorship case, any
prior restraint must be limited to a preservation of the status quo for the shortest possible
time until a temporary judicial restraint can be ordered. Generally, even in this context, an
unlawful prior restraint may be found if the procedure does not assure a prompt final judi-
cial decision. Id. at 59. In Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973), the Court allowed
detention of a copy of an obscene film "for the bona fide purpose of preserving it as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding."
The Supreme Court extended the Freedman doctrine to apply to the system by which
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sought to be restrained would definitely result in "direct, immedi-
ate, and irreparable damage. ' 6M
In holding that the order entered in this case was an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech, the court in Bernard H examined
the requirements for a prior restraint and applied them to the
facts of the case. The first requirement for a prior restraint is that
it is generally judicial, not legislative, in origin.5 7 The order was
unquestionably judicial in origin, having been promulgated by the
district court.5"
What next distinguishes a prior restraint from a criminal statute
forbidding expression is that "the sole purpose of a prior restraint
is suppression rather than punishment."' 9 The purpose of a nonso-
licitation order was undoubtedly to suppress communication. The
trial court in Bernard had previously denied the plaintiffs the right
to publish a notice that there was a pending class action, and that
putative class members were entitled to consult legal counsel to
protect their interests in the suit.10 The means of enforcement of
this order, although both the text of the order and the Manual for
Complex Litigation are silent in this regard, is the contempt power
of the court." Punishment by contempt has been described as an
"important attribute" of a prior restraint that distinguishes it from
a criminal statute forbidding a specific type of expression .
A prior restraint is distinguished from a statute prohibiting pub-
lication because the former has "an immediate and irreversible
federal customs agents seize imported materials, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971), and to the system by which postal inspectors restrict use of
the mails, Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1971).
56. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 833 (5th Cir.
1979). In Krishna, the Fifth Circuit repeated its firm stand that guilt by association with a
group, even when the group has violated the law on numerous occasions, cannot support a
prior restraint. This is so, even if it might appear that the chances are great that the "sin-
ner" may sin again. Id. at 833.
57. 619 F.2d at 467-68.
58. Id. at 463.
59. Id. at 468. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931), a prior restraint provided
for no punishment, except for civil contempt, but for "suppression and injunction, that is,
for restraint upon publication."
60. 596 F.2d at 1267 (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although
the "constitutional right" exception in paragraph two of the order seemed to permit retros-
pective filing in place of prior court approval, counsel in good faith (and also rather tenta-
tively after having been charged with unethical and illegal conduct) asked the court for
permission to post the notice. Permission was denied. Id. at 1266-67.
61. 619 F.2d at 468-69.
62. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
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sanction.""' It has been said that the threat of criminal or civil
punishment after publication "chills" speech, but a prior restraint
"freezes" speech at least for a while." The present order effectively
"froze" the plaintiffs' speech by severing all communication be-
tween attorneys or the named plaintiffs who were clients and ac-
tual and potential class members. The order stopped investigation
and discovery at a crucial point, just after suit was filed."e More-
over, the ban on communication was especially harmful since this
was a race discrimination case and counsel included members of
the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., who have been
noted by the Supreme Court as expert in the field of civil rights
litigation." At the time the actual and putative class members
most needed expert advice, they were cut off from readily available
attorneys until the time to make a choice had lapsed.17
The first subparagraph of paragraph two of the order was care-
fully scrutinized in Bernard II. The subparagraph forbade "solici-
tation directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential and
actual class members who are not formal parties to the class ac-
tion."" Although the Fifth Circuit has recognized the need in class
actions for broad managerial power by the trial court,69 the re-
straints upon attorney-client communication stretch that power
beyond its justifiable limits. As previously noted, the Supreme
Court has found occasion to conclude that solicitation may be a
constitutionally protected form of expression. In NAACP v. But-
ton, 0 the Court held that client solicitation within the context of a
civil rights case was entitled to protection under the first and four-
teenth amendments. Likewise, in Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
63. Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
64. Id. These arctic modifiers of "speech" seem to suggest that a subsequent restraint on
speech or publication might instill apprehension in the would be violator, but at least he has
the option to choose between committing the sin and abstaining therefrom. Conversely,
when a prior restraint on speech or publication is imposed, the potential sinner is not even
given the chance to choose between good and evil.
65. 619 F.2d at 469-70.
66. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422 (1963). In Button, the Court found that, in
some instances, solicitation of clients by an attorney may be permitted. The Court held the
solicitation to be one of the "protected freedoms of expression and association" of the first
amendment. 371 U.S. at 422. If plaintiff members of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. were not permitted to solicit clients in this context (civil rights action),
then all such activity on behalf of black citizens could be frozen out. Id. at 431-36.
67. 619 F.2d at 470.
68. 596 F.2d at 1258-59 n.9. For the complete order see note 17 supra.
69. In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
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men v. Virginia State Bar,1 the Court held that members of a
labor union were constitutionally entitled to advise injured workers
of their right to obtain legal advice and to recommend specific law-
yers. Any lawyers who accepted employment under this plan were
also afforded constitutional protection.72 The Court soon recog-
nized that the principles announced in Button apply not only to
litigation "bound up with political matters of acute social mo-
ment," but that small causes are entitled to the same protection as
great ones. 78 Moreover, rights to engage in group activity are
designed to provide "meaningful access to the courts"-a funda-
mental first amendment right.74 Finally, a recent Supreme Court
decision held that a lawyer who was a member of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was entitled to send a letter offering
free legal assistance from the ACLU, even though this form of so-
licitation was proscribed by certain Disciplinary Rules of the South
Carolina Supreme Court.7  The Court's rationale lay in the fact
that appellant's act was not "in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain." 76
The Bernard II court held the principles espoused in Button to
be directly applicable to this case. The only material difference be-
tween Bernard II and Button is that in Button there was no choice
between a lawsuit and a conciliation offer as there was in Bernard
II. However, the people attending the Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund meetings in Button did not have to choose between
initiating a lawsuit and not taking part in a lawsuit. The type of
choice the actual or putative class parties would have to make in
Bernard II and in Button does not so greatly differ as to remove it
from the scope of protected activity in Button. Therefore, stated
the court, "The characteristics of the solicitation that brought it
within constitutional protection in Button are equally present in
this case. 77
71. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
72. Id. at 8.
73. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
74. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
75. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978). The Court held that the denial of an appel-
lant's solicitation constituted a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. The rule
at issue was South Carolina's DR 2-104(A) (which is also a part of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Code of Professional Responsibility) which prohibited a lawyer who gave unsolicited
advice from accepting employment except under very limited circumstances. Id. at 420 n.11.
76. Id. at 422. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (solicitation of
business by a lawyer by in-person communication with the intent to receive remuneration
has long been viewed as an improper attorney-client relationship).
77. 619 F.2d at 472. See also Great W. Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill.
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While the court held that the order is a prior restraint, the un-
constitutionality of the order rests on other grounds as well.7 8 A
judicial order imposing a subsequent restraint on speech, while not
accorded the same status as a prior restraint, must nonetheless
"endure even closer scrutiny than a legislative restriction."79 Much
of the district court's order was vague and overbroad.80 In Shelton
v. Tucker,8' the Supreme Court held that "even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can-
not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties." Although arguably the governmental interest in manag-
ing the class action was substantial in Bernard II, the fundamental
first amendment rights of the parties involved clearly overshad-
owed these considerations.
After holding that the district court's order violated the first
amendment, the court made short work of the issue of the "appro-
priateness" of the order under Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 2 Although the majority in Bernard II rapidly dis-
pensed with the "appropriate order" question, the dissent in Ber-
nard I shed some light on the issue. Certainly Rule 23(d) requires
the district judge to exercise his discretion in making orders since
the term "appropriate" connotes the exercise of discretion. What
may be appropriate in one context might not be appropriate in an-
other.83 However, actual or potential communications between par-
ties to a class action in many instances serve to effectuate the pur-
poses of Rule 23 by encouraging common participation in a
lawsuit.8
1979) (holding a rule similar to the district court's order in Bernard II inapplicable to non-
profit solicitation).
78. 619 F.2d at 477 n.33. The Court stated that "[e]ven under the more relaxed analysis
accorded subsequent restraints the order fails to pass constitutional muster." Id.
79. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). In Bauer, the court held that rules seeking to proscribe extrajudicial
comments by lawyers in both criminal and civil litigation must not be too vague or over-
broad. The court stated that "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental inter-
est involved." 522 F.2d at 249 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
80. 619 F.2d at 473 n.26.
81. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 100 S. Ct. 826 (1980), where the Court invalidated a local ordinance prohibit-
ing door-to-door solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations not using at least
75% of their receipts for charitable purposes. The proposed restraint will not be upheld
unless it is "intimately related to substantial government interest." Id. at 836.
82. 619 F.2d at 478.
83. 596 F.2d at 1268 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
84. Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977). Marsh
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Not all members of the Bernard II court believed the constitu-
tional issues should have been addressed.88 "A federal court should
not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive
nonconstitutional ground is available."8 6 The concurring judges ar-
gued that the majority should have first determined whether the
district court's order was an "appropriate order" under Rule 23(d)
before even considering the constitutional issues. Interlocutory or-
ders of court in a class action context are certainly reviewable, and
the majority should first determine whether the district judge
abused his discretion in handing down the order.87
The majority opinion is not, as the concurrence states, "a need-
less excursion into a difficult and little-explored area of constitu-
tional law." 8 The majority supports its decision with persuasive
case law, coming in large part from the United States Supreme
Court. 9 The court saw that the order represented a "significant
restriction on First Amendment rights." 90 Moreover, since no other
court of appeals had ruled on the constitutionality of the proposed
order form found in the Manual for Complex Litigation, and since
the proposed order had been so widely adopted, the court felt com-
addressed the "appropriate order" question without undertaking the "prior restraint" con-
stitutional question. The court held that although a plaintiff's activites in contacting present
or former employees to interest them in participating in an employment discrimination suit
may have violated the ethics of the legal profession, her actions were not abuses of the class
action device since she was encouraging "common participation in the litigation of her...
discrimination claim." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.,
508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 969 (1975); In re General Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
85. 619 F.2d at 478 (Tjoflat, J., with whom Brown, Gee, Henderson and Reavley, J.J.,
join, specially concurring).
86. Id., (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974)). In Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909), the Supreme Court held that generally a court does
not address questions arising under the Federal Constitution when the questions may be
otherwise answered, unless there is an important reason. In his often-cited concurring opin-
ion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Mr. Justice Brandeis reaffirmed the hold-
ing in Siler: "[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitu-
tional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter." 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
87. 619 F.2d at 479. The concurring judges quoted In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust
Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1977), in support of their position. Therein the
Fifth Circuit stated "Appellate review is necessary to assure that the rights of absentee class
members are not inundated in the wake of a district court's brisk supervision." Id. The
concurring judges deemed the tool of appellate review to be sufficient to prevent potential
abuses of judicial orders. There was no need to address the constitutional question. Id.
88. 619 F.2d at 481 (footnote omitted).
89. E.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
90. 619 F.2d at 466.
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pelled to address the constitutional issues. The court recognized
three local rules among the district courts of the Fifth Circuit,"' as
well as five local rules from districts outside the Fifth Circuit.9 2
Why did the Fifth Circuit choose the more difficult
path-addressing the constitutional issues, rather than taking the
road more often travelled-determining whether the trial judge
abused his discretion? The court commended District Judge Bue
of the Southern District of Texas who, in adopting the rule sug-
gested by the Manual for Complex Litigation, included only the
specific prohibitions against communication, rather than across-
the-board restraints.93 Judge Bue's primary reason for departing
from the suggested rule was to avoid a violation of the first amend-
ment by overbreadth.' The court must have recognized that the
potential for abuse in such orders is great. Perhaps the court's
overriding interest in the administration of justice required it
boldly to forego the simple path, and to venture into the realm of
the constitutional determination.
Speculating on the impact of Bernard II is not a simple task.
The case has served as precedent on only one occasion since the
decision was handed down. The Fifth Circuit, in In re Lilla Ann
Norton, 9 5 held that the case at bar "stood squarely on all fours"
with Bernard II, and vacated all orders enforcing Local Rule 17 of
the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, remanding
the case for proceedings consistent with Bernard I1.9'
The fire may yet be burning since Bernard II has now been ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. The petition for writ
of certiorari states:
As the district court's order was based directly upon the proposed
91. Id. at 467 n.9. See S.D. FLA. R. 19; N.D. GA. R. 3, 221.2; S.D. TEx. R. 6.
92. 619 F.2d at 467 n.9. See N.D. ILL. R. 22; D. MD. R. 20; M.D. N.C. R. 17(B)(6); S.D.
OHio R. 3.9.4; W.D. WASH. R. 23(g).
93. 596 F.2d at 1274 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
94. Id. "The key to a constitutional rule which regulates class communication is to nar-
row down those instances in which a prior restraint is imposed to those in which the types
of communications subject to judicial review before dissemination are clearly defined and
clearly capable of Rule 23 abuse." Id.
95. 622 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. Local Rule 17 was based on suggested Local Rule 7 of the Manual for Complex
Litigation. Id. In re Lilla Ann Norton was a two-sentence opinion with no statement of
facts. What may distinguish Norton from Bernard II is that the former controversy was
based on a local rule while the latter was based on an order. According to petitioner to the
Supreme Court, "the Fifth Circuit seems to draw no distinction between local court rules
and orders limiting communications." Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 13 n.4 (U.S. Filed Sept. 17, 1980).
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order recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, the
Fifth Circuit's opinion is in conflict with the distinguished Board
of Editors of the Federal Judicial Center. Moreover, as the Man-
ual's suggested rule and order has been adopted by numerous dis-
trict courts across the nation, the Fifth Circuit's decision has im-
plications and importance which reach far beyond the facts of the
instant case.9
It will be interesting to note how Bernard II is relied upon by the
sister circuits. The constitutional issue involved is too significant to
elude further discussion and examination.
ROBERT S. COHEN
97. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11 (U.S., filed Sept. 17,
1980) (footnote omitted).
